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Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

March 5, 1968

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Gregory B. Wolfe, Esquire
Director, Office of Research and
Analysis for American Republics (BAR/IAR)
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Greg:

Sorry to be a little late in replying to your February 12 letter on the SNIE assessing possible reactions if the F-5 offer is withdrawn.

I have passed it around to various members of the staff and we all agree that it is a first-rate job. The comments on what would happen in Brazil seem to us to hit the nail right on the head.

I note that Tom Hughes took exception to the assessment that U.S. objectives or base rights in Brazil would be affected by withdrawal of the F-5 offer. We take exception to his exception! Nearly all of our U.S. military and civilian base rights requirements in Brazil are located on and are supported by Brazilian Air Force bases or facilities. It seems to us perfectly obvious that a withdrawal of the F-5 offer would be clearly resented by the Brazilian Air Force and interpreted -- correctly -- as reneging on a commitment. You are undoubtedly aware that our relations with the Brazilian military, though still good, have fallen off lately for a variety of reasons. A withdrawal of the F-5 offer would almost certainly increase the prestige of the supernationalists and Francophiles within FAB, making it more difficult for the GOB to cooperate as closely with us as it has on the question of U.S. scientific and military programs.

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Declassified Authority: 44281 By: Laurie
Madsen Date: 04-14-2015

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By now you have probably talked to Sam Lewis and have had a first-hand reading on how JRCC is working. From our point of view, I think it is turning out quite well, [redacted]

[redacted] I can assure you the JRCC is not functioning in such a way as to suppress spot reporting from São Paulo or any other Consulate. The São Paulo comments were incorporated in our overall reports on the "alert" and we have made it a practice to forward reports from any of the Consulates that can contribute to the situation, generally in their entirety. For example, various reports were forwarded from Recife during the alert crisis and one was forwarded virtually in its complete text from Porto Alegre. The fact is that São Paulo didn't report very much, but this is undoubtedly due to the fact that most of the activity was in the military and we have the best access to that particular source right here in Rio.

Glad to hear that the Task Force is still in contact. I gather we have been superseded by BALPA but thanks to the good work of you and your colleagues I am sure that our contribution to BALPA is significantly greater than that of other Embassies. I would be interested in any comparisons that you might be able to pick up.

Sincerely,

John W. Tuthill

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